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Covenant and Compact:
Bases for Citizen Obligation
by
David H. Moore

Views on the role of the government and the role of the citizen have changed in modern
America, leading to an idea that government is the provider of goods to be consumed and that
citizens have no obligations to with respect to the government. Thefounding documents ofAmerica
suggest that this is not so. Rather, the American founding is based on the ideas of covenant and
compact. Covenants and compacts require all parties to agree to certain obligations. Thefounding
of America and of American states was accomplished through covenants and compacts, and
consequently place obligations on citizens.
Introduction
Today, America's political and social
system suffers from what Daniel Elazar terms
consumerism. Instead of seeing themselves
as responsible citizens, many Americans
perceive themselves as consumers (Elazar
1988,82). The traditional idea of citizenship
as individual participation in the polity and
contribution to society (upon which our nation
was founded) has been supplanted by the
notion of residence, which allegedly entitles
the individual to demand benefits from a
government "out there," whose success is
measured by its ability to deliver (Elazar 1976,
4). In response, governments have solicited
greater resources in a "politics of purchased
solutions" which "substitutes money for
commitment" (21). This trend that is transforming citizenship into consumerism and
government into commerce has lead to
predatorial behavior and has eclipsed understanding of indi vidual responsibility to society
and to the polity. To combat this threat, we
must restore a true understanding of the
principles upon which our nation was founded:
the principles of covenant and compact. In
this essay, I will explain the concepts of
covenant and compact and show that our

system was founded on them. I will then
explore the obligations that result from our
national covenant and compact.

The Concepts of Covenant and Compact
The idea of the covenant, as Elazar
explains, comes from Hebrew scripture and
consists of a mutual promise voluntarily
effected by independent parties in the presence
of higher authority, often God. Covenants
are usually meant to be eternal and are often
political, though they also govern the divine
relationship between God and man (1988, 30,
90). As witnessed in the Bible, the covenant
places moral and legal obligations on all who
enter into it. The covenant people of Israel,
for example, were not only to measure their
products justly, but they were also to "be holy"
as the Lord was holy (Leviticus 19:2, 36).
Thus, the covenant bound all, including God,
to legal and moral virtue (Wardle 1987, 16).
While the American colonists, according
to Donald Lutz, often used the verbs "agree,"
"compact," and "covenant" synonymously,
there remains a difference between these
concepts (1988, 16, 19). Both covenants and
compacts involve consensual public agreements
and require participants to treat each other
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according to the spirit of the law and not
according to the narrow, contractual readings.
The covenant, however, differs from the
compact in that its moral aspects supersede
its legal aspects (Elazar 1988, 91; Lutz 1988,
18). Further, God is usually cited as a witness
in the covenant, while the people remain the
highest authority in the compact (Elazar 1988,
91; Lutz 1988, 17,28). As both Lutz and
Elazar recognize, the compact is a secular form
of the covenant which removes God as a party
and focusses on relationships between men
(Elazar 1988, 30; Lutz 1988, 28).
Locke best explained the notion of the
compact. He believed that in the state of
nature, men are free and equal (1689, 3). In
order to receive the benefits of community,
men make social compacts to form societies.
This voluntary agreement is the onlyway that
a legitimate political system may begin and
is "[t]he only way whereby anyone divests
himself of his natural liberty and puts on the
bonds of civil-society" (58). Once men unite
in society, they surrender the powers necessary
to accomplish the ends of that society and
submit to majority rule, limiting their own
freedom (60). Thus, the compact, like the
covenant, places limitations and obligations
on its integrants.

Citizen Obligations Inherent in Covenants
and Compacts
When men enter into a covenant, "[s]o
long as [the] authorities [of the covenant are]
. . . acting within the sphere of authority
established by the covenant, [men are] ..
obligated to obey" (Baldwin cited in Wardle
1987,16). As mentioned, even God becomes
subject to the covenant's terms (Wardle 1987,
16). Obedience to the law is thus the most
basic obligation emanating from a covenant
or compact.

John Finnis elucidates why covenantors
or compactors are obligated to obey. When
men enter a covenant or compact, he explains,
they do so for the common good, i.e., to
obtain rewards attainable only in a community
and only through the rule of law. He states
that, first, citizens must be law-abiding in
order to obtain the common good. Second,
where an act is made obligatory by law, the
citizen must perform that act to be law-abiding.
Thus, the citizen is obliged to execute acts
required by the law (1988, 316). At the very
least, then, any covenant or compact requires
participants to obey the law.
This is true; but more is required. As
Milton Knovitz notes, the voluntary nature
of the covenant provides a basis for both
political and moral obedience (Cited in Vetterli
and Bryner 1987,36). Similarly, the voluntary
social compact stipulates that people receive
the benefits of societal life and in tum owe
certain obligations, besides obedience (Cheney
1985, 7). They enjoy what Daniel Elazar
entitles "federal liberty. " When the Declaration
of Independence speaks of liberty as an
inalienable right, says Elazar, it does not refer
to an absolute liberty, but a federal liberty
(1988, 98). According to Elazar, "[f]ederal
liberty is necessary to prevent the disaster of
anarchy and the diseases of natural liberty"
(172) and consists of freedom to live in
accordance with the rules of the covenant (or
compact) that initiated the system (128). Acts
that violate the nature of the societal agreement
are anarchic and so justifiably prohibited and
punished by government (128). Thus, the
covenant and the compact not only oblige the
citizen to obey the laws, but also to live in
accordance with the spirit or principles of the
While obedience
covenant or compact.
remains a constant obligation for citizens of
all covenanted or compacted societies, the
principles that citizens must adhere to vary
depending on the nature of each covenant or
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compact. Therefore, after addressing arguments against the idea that covenants and
compacts provide a basis for citizen obligation,
and after documenting how covenant and
compact form the foundation of the American
polity and society, I will identify some of the
American citizen's obligations that stem from
that foundation.

Obligation of Those Born into the Covenant
or Compact ,
Locke, in his Second Treatise of
Government, identifies an alleged flaw in his
theory of the social compact: that except for
the original compactors, all men are born
under a government and so never have the
opportunity to voluntarily enter the social
compact into which they are born or to
establish another one (1689, 69). Locke
responds "that a child is born a subject of no
country or government." Children are raised
by their parents until they reach the age at
which they can choose independently what
society they will join (72). This choice can
be made through express or tacit consent (72).
For example, while a child may not expressly
offer his consent, if he accepts his father's
property, obtains other possessions within the
realm of that society, or enjoys some of the
benefits of that society, then he has given his
tacit consent and he is obligated to fulfill the
responsibilities of a citizen of that compact
(71, 73).
The Conventionalists, as Noel Reynolds
explains, offer a similar explanation to the
problem of birth under the covenant or
compact (1991). Like Locke, they believe
that a man can show his consent through his
actions as well as his words. They assert that
children are not full citizens, because they do
not have all the benefits of the society.
Consequently, children do not have the same
citizen obligations as do adults, and their

punishments for disobeying the law are less
severe. When, however, a child reaches an
age where he is free to leave the country or
change its laws through suffrage and political
participation, then he shows his acceptance
of the system by remaining under its j urisdiction and enjoying its benefits. Thus, even
those who do not participate in the original
covenant or compact do, at least in the United
States, have the opportunity to voluntarily
consent to or dissent from the system. Once
they consent, they are morally bound to fulfill
their citizen obligations.

The American Polity
Compact

as Covenant and

The fact that our political system was
formed by both covenant and compact is
evident from the pervasiveness of these ideas
before and at the time of the founding and
from the documents that affected the founding
of our nation and of our government: the
Declaration of Independence, the federal
Constitution, and the state constitutions.

The Pervasiveness of Covenantism in
Colonial America
The idea of the covenant was commonplace
and widely accepted in colonial America. As
Lynn Wardle notes in his article "The Constitution as Covenant," almost all the religious
sects and settlements that came to America
brought with them covenant theology: the
Pilgrims, the Puritans, the Anabaptists, the
Presbyterians, etc. (1987, 12). The Puritans,
most often recognized as the primary adherents
to and disseminators of covenantism, were,
according to Clinton Rossiter, "'obsessed with
the covenant or contract, relying on this handy
instrument to explain almost every relation
of man to man and man to God ". (cited in
Wardle 1987, 12). While Donald Lutz
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recognizes the expansive influence of the
Puritans, he maintains that the Calvinists were
also very familiar with covenant theology and
as the dominant religion in much of colonial
America, were even more influential in
spreading the covenant perspective (1988,
24-25).
Regardless of which sect was most
instrumental in spreading covenant theology,
the fact remains that about four-fifths of
colonial New England's church-attenders
belonged to Protestant faiths that taught the
covenant theology as an essential part of their
doctrine (Wardle 1987, 13). By 1780,
America boasted over 1900 congregations of
"'covenant theology' mainline denominations"
(Marty cited in Wardle 1987,23). Clearly,
covenantism was a widely accepted doctrine
in colonial America.

The Use of Covenant in Colonial America
Not only was covenantism a widespread
idea, but the idea of the covenant was put into
practice in organizing churches, "scientific
and reform societies, labor unions, and
professional associations as well as business
corporations" (Elazar 1988, 33).
Most
importantly, the covenant formed the base of
many of the colonial political organizations
(Wardle 1987, 12). Those of the Plymouth
Colony, for example, covenanted to form a
"body politick" when they arrived. Their
covenant, recorded in the Mayflower Compact,
reads:
Haveing undertaken, for the glorie of God, and
the advancemente of the Christian faith, and
honour of our king and countrie, a voyage to
plant the first colonie in the Northerne parts of
Virginia, doe by these presente solemnly and
mutually in the presence of God, and one
another, covenant and coml}ine our selves
togeather into a civill body politick; for our
betterorderingand preservation and furtherance
of the ends aforesaid; and by vertue hearof to

enacte, constitute, and frame such just and equa1l
lawes, ordinances, acts, constitutions, and
offices, from time to time, as shall be thought
most meete and convenient for the generallgood
of the Colonie, unto which we promise all due
submission and obedience (cited in Mclaughlin
1932, 18-19).

Thus, they called upon God as a witness and
covenanted both to him and to each other to
establish a political system. Later, in 1639,
the people of Connecticut made a similar
covenant which is recorded in America's'" first
written constitution''': the Fundamental Orders
of Connecticut (Mclaughlin and Rossiter cited
in Wardle 1987, 14). In this document the
people agreed to "assotiate and conioyne
[them] ... selues to be as one Publike State
or Comonwelth; and .. enter into Combination
and Confederation togather" in order to
establish a government "according to God"
(perry 1978, 120). Other political documents,
like the 1636 Pilgrim Code of Law, were also
based on covenants (Lutz 1988, 25). The most
important of these is the Declaration of Independence, which created the American nation
through a covenant.

The Covenant as the Foundation of the
American Nation
In that famous document, "representatives of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ... appealing to the Supreme Judge
of the world for the rectitude of [their]. .....
intentions, [and] ... in the name, and by the
authority of the good people of these colonies,
solemnly [declared] ...... That these United
Colonies are and of a right ought to be, FREE
and INDEPENDENT STATES" (perry 1978,
321). This statement embodies a tripartite
covenant between God as the witness, the
states and the United States (Elazar 1988, 106).
The representatives' recognition of the
"consent of the governed" as the basis for all
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government and the grievances against King
George, which suggest what the Americans
thought good government should be, constitute
the terms of that covenant (100, 105). Thus,
America as a nation was born out of and
remains founded on a covenant.
The Pervasiveness of Compact Philosophy
in Colonial America
Having established the influence of
covenant theology in America and having
shown that the American nation is based on
a covenant, I will now proceed to document
the influence of the idea of the compact and
its role in the founding of our political system.
once again, evidence of the expansive acceptance of this philosophy combined with
documentary examples of its practice in the
United States will prove that our system is
based simultaneously on the covenant and the
compact.
Like the concept of the covenant, that of
the social compact (that society and government are formed by the consent of those
involved) was widespread in colonial America
(Mclaughlin cited in Wardle 1987, 15). John
Davenport, a New Englander, explained the
idea of the social compact twenty years before
Locke did in the Second Treatise (15).
Preachers freely taught the doctrines of Milton
and Locke from the pulpit, making them
familiar to all (15). As Andrew Mclaughlin
pointed out, "[tlhe New Englander of 1780,
when he voted to ratify and establish the state
constitution, or later ... the Constitution of
the United States . . . would have been
perplexed had he been told that power,
authority, and obedience were not all the fruit
of the agreement" (1932, 84). All the men
educated in the thinking of the day "believed
that all decent government originated in
compact; they were not as yet far removed

from Milton's declaration that no one would
be so stupid as to deny it" (81).
The Use of the Compact in Colonial America
As a result of this widespread acceptance
of the compact and the secularization of the
covenant (Lutz 1988,28), the bulk of colonial
political structures were established as compacts. The 1641 Combination of the Settlers
Upon the Piscataqua River for Government
was the first intentionally secular covenant
and hence, compact (30). A host of political
compacts followed. The 1641 Massachusetts
Body of Liberties, for example, identified the
rights of the citizens and affirmed them" with
. . . sollemne consent" (Perry 1978, 148).
The Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776, recognized
that certain rights could not be wrested from
men by compact and that all political "power
is vested in ... the people" (311). In the
same year, the Constitution of Pennsylvania
thanked God (though it did not calion Him
as a witness) that "the people of this State,
by common consent," were able to establish
their own rules for their government (328).
Concurrently, the Delaware Declaration of
Rights and the Constitution of Maryland
declared "that all government of right originates from the people, is founded in compact
onl y , and instituted for the good of the whole"
(338, 346). Further, the 1780 Constitution
of Massachusetts explained that'" [T]he body
politic is formed by a voluntary association
of individuals. It is a social compact by which
the whole people covenants with each citizen
and each citizen with the whole people, that
all shall be governed by certain laws for the
common good'" (cited in Elazar 1988, 33).
All these documents testify that many if not
most colonial polities were founded on a
social, political compact.
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The Compact as the Foundation of the
American Political System
The most central political documents
of the modern United States are the federal
and state constitutions. Also influenced by
the widespread covenant/compact philosophy
of colonial times, these constitutions reveal
that America's modern governments and
political societies are based on compact. A
constitution, according to Lutz, is a document
that describes the political institutions and
structure of a society (1988, 34). In accordance with this definition, both the federal and
the state constitutions focus on describing the
structure of the governments they form.
The preambles of these constitutions,
however, identify them as compacts. The
federal Constitution, for example, reads, "We
the people of the United States ... do ordain
and establish this Constitution for the United
States of America." This statement, enforced
by the fact that the federal Constitution was
ratified by the American people, established
the Constitution as the record of a national
compact.
Similarly all the state constitutions
begin with a preamble that says something like
this: We, the people of the State of
,
in order to obtain certain ends (for example,
justice, liberty and domestic tranquility) (1901
Constitution of Alabama in Legislative Drafting
Research Fund of Columbia University 1962,
1: 9) and grateful for the blessings of the
Almighty God, "do ordain and establish this
constitution" (1959 Constitution of Alaska in
Legislative Drafting Research Fund 1962, 2:
7). All the state constitutions, except those
of Oregon and Tennessee, mention God in
their preamble, giving them a decidedly moral
tone. The Constitution of West Virginia goes
so far as to say, "we, the people of West Virginia, in and through the provisions of this

Constitution, reaffirm our faith in and constant
reliance upon God" (2: 7). None, however,
call upon God as a witness to their agreement;
therefore, none constitute covenants. All do,
however, in the style of a compact recognize
that "[a]ll political power is inherent in the
people" (1912 Constitution of Arizona in
Legislative Drafting Research Fund of the
University of Columbia 1962, 1:9). The 1867
Constitution of Maryland goes further to
explain "[t]hat all Government of right
originates from the People, is founded in
compact only, and instituted solely for the
good of the whole" (1: 9). And the 1784
Constitution of New Hampshire further
articulates that "[wlhen men enter into a state
of society, they surrender up some of their
natural rights to that society, in order to ensure
the protection of others" (2: 7). Thus, the
preambles of the state constitutions--which
establish them as acts of the people of the
states and as a recognition of the principles
of the social compact--identify the state polities
as compacts.
Lutz explains that technically, the preambles in both federal and state constitutions
should come before the title constitution, for
what we have now are "really compacts in
which the constitution [the description of the
government's institutions] became predominant" (1988, 34). Regardless of where the
preambles figure in the text of the various
constitutions, they signal that the federal and
state political systems are formed by compact.
Some would argue that the federal
Constitution is actually a covenant. Lynn
Wardle, for example, traces the influence of
covenant theology in colonial America and
demonstrates how the Constitution and many
of the ideas in it emerged from the covenant
tradition and concludes that the Constitution
is a covenant (1987). According to our
definition of covenant, however, this conclusion cannot be valid, for the Constitution of
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1787 removed God as a witness and created
a secular compact (Elazar 1988, 136).
The federal Constitution, aside from being
a compact, may be said to embody a covenant.
As Elazar explains, "Normally a covenant
precedes a constitution and creates the people
or civil society that then proceeds to adopt
a constitution of government for itself. Thus
a constitution involves implementing a prior
covenant--effectuating [it] ... into an actual
frame or structure of government" (1988, 91).
This view seems plausible. We established
that the Declaration of Independence constituted a .national covenant which created us as
a nation or society. According to Elazar's
view, the Articles of Confederation and later
the Constitution can thus be seen as the
constitutions that established, through compact,
a political structure for that original covenant.

Citizen Obli&ations that Result from the
Covenant/Compact Foundation of the
American Political System
While the federal Constitution may be
considered a compact embodying a covenant,
it remains clear that the state constitutions are
compacts and that our national identity, created
by the Declaration of Independence, is founded
on a covenant. From these covenants and
compacts emerges a strong justification for
the obligation of American citizenship.

Obedience and Civic Duties
We have already noted that all covenants
or compacts require obedience to the laws.
Civil obedience, then, is an obvious obligation
of members of the American nation and polity.
But the obedience required of Americans must
be active not passive, says Associate Justice
Brewer (1909, 9293). Brewer, the Founders,
President Lincoln and others realized that a
greater degree of citizenship was required of

Americans, because they had been given so
much, and because the American system
locates political control in the hands of the
people (Brewer 1909,23). Lincoln reminded
a group of citizens in Indianapolis in 1861,
"that with [the citizen] . . . and not with
politicians, not with the President, not with
officeseekers, but with [the citizen] .. is the
question, 'Shall the Union and shall the
liberties of this country be preserved to the
latest generation?'" (Cited in Elazar 1988,
211). The United States citizen cannot transfer
his obligation to the government, because "[h]e
is the government" (Brewer 1909, 27)
Because the American compacts created
a representative democracy requiring citizen
participation, the American citizen has a host
of civic duties. According to Cheney, who
wrote to a juvenile audience, these civic duties
include participating in government in order
to influence laws, expenditures and taxation
(1985, 16-17), cooperating with authorities
to enforce the law (17), paying taxes fairly
(23), accepting a draft assignment or possibly
volunteering for the armed forces (30-32),
obtaining an education so as to be able to
participate intelligently in society (34, 3738),
casting informed votes (39-40), and cooperating in the community, realizing that we share
our world with others (51). Brewer notes
many of the same civic duties (Brewer 1909,
62, 64). Joseph Larsen, writing specifically
to Latter-day Saints, identifies two main civic
duties: electing good leaders and participating
in public decision-making and problem-solving
(1986, 14).

Moral Duties
Due to the fact that the American compact
established a republic, relying to a large extent
on self-control and not on government coercion, the responsibilities of the American
citizen do not stop with obedience to law and
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civic involvement. The American Founders
believed that man had a dual nature, capable
of both virtue and vice (Madison 1787, 15;
Hamilton 1787, 11; Vetterli and Bryner 1987,
170; Elazar 1988, 165). They knew that for
society to survive, men had to control their
vices (paine cited in Vetterli and Bryner 1987,
180). Because the American system would
not control its citizens, they would have to
moderate themselves. Thus, the Founders
expected a certain character from the American
citizen, a moderate virtue, and they knew that
without it, the system would fail (Vetterli and
Bryner 1987, 187).
Others have echO(li this view. Cheney
holds that citizens should do good because it
will benefit society as a whole, not because
it will bring them profit or allow them to
escape punishment. Brewer asserted that" each
citizen owes to the nation the duty of maintaining in himself a high, clean, moral character"
(1909, 35). He also advanced that citizens
have an obligation of willing, intelligent,
"unselfish and conscientious" service (61).
Finally, he believed that Americans have an
obligation to work to improve the nation's life

(109). In view of the blessings that we receive
from living in America, Brewer said, we
should strive to preserve and strengthen the
morality of the nation (109).
Conclusion
The list of moral and legal obligations of
the American citizen could continue. These
suffice to show that trends toward consumerism
and excessive individualism and away from
citizenship circumvent our true responsibility.
Adult American citizens who possess and enjoy
the property, public services and other benefits
of this system and who have means whereby
to participate in the system are legitimately
subject to obligations emanating from the
covenant expressed in the Declaration of
Independence and from the compacts recorded
by the federal and state constitutions. To
check any moves toward predatorial consumerism, we must resurrect an understanding
of our citizen obligations, teach them to our
populace, and begin to live them in order to
preserve the covenant and compact, which
constitute the foundations of our nation.
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